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1. Introduction 
A series of studies by Shibatani (2009, 2014) and Shibatani et al. (2014) have made a claim 
that we have to advance the notion of nominalization for better grammatical and typological 
characterizations of languages beyond linguistic descriptions that have been explicitly or 
implicitly based on those of Standard European languages (cf. Croft 2001). One essential 
point of Shibatani’s proposal, analyzing Asian and European languages, is that we should 
introduce the notion of nominalization in place of that of traditionally－巴mployedrelative clause 
(or its equivalent) so that we could provide proper characterizations for the huge diversity 
cross-linguistically observed in such an area of grammar. The aim of this article is to support 
Shibatani’s theory of nominalization with an exploration of the American languages of Eskimo 
and Athabaskan. Furthermore, we attempt to bring forth a cognitive-grammar motivation for 
th巴problemof why the notion of nominalization could be considered better for the linguistic 
analysis than the traditional idea of relative-clause formation, proposing an idea of metonymic 
coercion that presumably works, to a greater or lesser extent, for every nominal construal. 
In the next section, we will first observe the essential characteristics of the Eskimo and 
Athabaskan counte中artsof "adjectives”and “relative clauses，＇’clan今ingthe issue of why the 
traditional notion of relative clause could be considered as insufficient to capture the relevant 
linguistic facts. In section 3, then, our framework of Shibatani’s theory of nominalization will 
be reviewed, accompanied by a complementary discussion on how Shibatani’s classification of 
nominalization is backed up in th巴 lightof the cognitive-grammar characterization of 
metonymic coercion. Concluding remarks are provided in section 4. 
2. Essential Characteristics of Eskimo and Athabaskan“adjective”and “relative clause" 
One interesting formal characteristic of Eskimo languages and Athabaskan languages is 
that they both have no parts of speech of a司jective,no relative pronouns, and no particular 
grammatical construction used only for the relative-clause formation (cf. Fortescue 1984 and 
Jacobson 1995:250, 254 for Eskimo languages; Sapir 1923:13ι7, Young and Morgan 1980, 
and Willie 1989・：419for Athabaskan languages). In other words, as will be shown below, the 
two languages have no linguistic strategy specialized for relativization such as English 
relative-clause construction. The aim of this section is to show the way the adjectival notion 
and the relative-clausal notion observed in, for instance, English are expressed grammatically in 
the two languages. In particular, we will pay attention to the fact that in these two languages, 
essentially the same formal strategy is employed for the four types of linguistic coding 
traditionally called “adjective，”“headed relative clause，＇’“headless relative clause," and 
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“deverbal noun." In the following, we first examine the relevant data of Central Alaskan 
Yup’ik (an Eskimo), and then we mov巴 tothose of Navajo (an Athabaskan). Finally, the 
implication induced from the analysis of th巴twolanguages will be shown. 
2.1. Central Alaskan Yup’ik (an Eskimo) 
As traditionally described in Eskimo grammar (e.g. Fortescue 1984 for W巴stGreenlandic), 
Central Alaskan Yup’ik (CAY hereafter) shows no word class of adjective, and the equivalents 
of, for instance, English adjectives are expressed by one of the followi月 threemeans: (i) 
“certain noun-to-noun postbases (derivational suffixes), such as -r1フak('big’） as in anyar1フak
'big boat'"; (i) certain nouns which are generally used in apposition to other nouns, such as alla 
('other’） as in angyaq allσ‘other boat’で（ii）“nounsformed with the postbase -lria .. and then 
used in apposition to other nouns, such as angyaq cukalria‘fast boat’” (Jacobson 1995:253, my 
parentheses).1 
With this description, let us first make sure that CAY has no formal distinction between 
verb and adjective. Consider the following pair of examples. 
(1) a. qilugtuq. ( qilug-uq) ’It is barking.’ b. cukauq (cuka-uq). 『Itis fast.’ 
bark-IND.3s fast-IND.3s 
As shown in (1 b ),the a司jectivalnotion of “fast”is coded in the same way as the verbal notion 
of “bark”・ the3rd person intransitive-indicative-mood marker, -uq, is suffixed in the same way 
for both of the roots, qilug－‘to bark' and cuka’‘to be fast.’Furthermore, as shown in (2) 
below, when the verbal root of qilug－‘bark’is used for an adjectival/participial use, a suffix for 
nominalization, -lria, is attached as in (2a), and the relationship between the head ('dog’） and 
the modifier ('barking’） is express巴dwith the apposition, as mentioned in (i) and (ii) above. 
The same strategy is employed to express the idea of ‘fast boat' as in (2b ).
(2) a. qimugta qilu-lria '(the) barking dog' 
dog bark-NMNL 
b. angyaq cuka-lria てthe)fast boat' 
boat fast-NMNL 
Now let us further consider how nomionalized verbal forms with -lria can be used. First, 
as shown in (3b) and (4b) below, example (2a) and (2b) can be construed as indicating either 
some permanent/lasting properties of the head nouns as shown in interpretation ( i) or some very 
temporal state of the head nouns (i), the construal of which depends on contexts (Caan 
Toopeltlook p.c. cf. Jacobson 1995:250, 254). 
(3) a. Tangrr-aqa angyaq. 'I saw the boat.『
see-IND.ls3s boat 
b. Tangrr-aqa angyaq cuka-lria. (i）‘I saw the fast boat' 
1 All the data and basic obs巴rvationson CAY are courtesy of Caan Toop巴tlok. I would also lik巴to
acknowledge the extensive works of St巴venJacobson as the primary source of my knowledg巴onCAY. 
The orthography of CAY巴mployedin this article follows Jacobson (1995) 
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see-IND.ls3s boat fast-NMNL (i）‘I saw the boat (that went) fast.’ 
c. Tangrr-aqa cuka-lria. (i) ‘I saw the fast thing.’ 
see-IND. ls3s fast-NMNL (i）‘I saw the thing (that went) fast.’ 
(4) a. Tangrr-aqa qimugta. ‘I saw the dog.’ 
see-IND.ls3s dog 
b. Tangrr-aqa qimugta qilu-lria. (i) ‘I saw the barking dog.' 
s巴e-IND.ls3s dog bark-NMNL (i）‘I saw由巳dogthat was barking.’ 
c. Tangrr-aqa qilu-lria. (i) ‘I saw the barking (one）.’ 
see-IND.ls3s bark-NMNL (i）‘I saw the one that was barking.’ 
Furthermore, as shown in (3c) and (4c), nomionalized verbal forms with -lria can be utilized as 
a direct obj巴ctwithout the head nouns, which suggests that the form itself should be regarded as 
a白11-fledgednoun, while it may express some temporal state as shown in interpretation (i) 
(Caan Toopeltlook p.c.) Finally, as exemplified in (5) below, some nomionalized verbal 
forms with -lriαhave been lexicalized so that they can be interpreted as a simple noun: (5c) 
shows thatα灼lriαcanbe suffixed by the third-person possessive marker, (ng)a like possessive 
forms of other simple nouns such as pani－〆her/hisdaughter' and nacaーピhis/herhat.’ 
(5) a. akag－’to rol' b. aka-lria (i)'the one that is rolling' 
rol-NMNL (i）‘car' 
c.aka・lria-nga 'his/her car' 
roll-NMNL-3s3s 
In sum, nomionalized verbal forms with ・lriacan, with a single form, indicate the three 
grammatical functions expressed by English adjective, (headed) relative clauses as in (3b) and 
( 4b ),and headless relative clause as in (3c) and ( 4c). Furthermore, with the process of 
lexicalization, the form can also be utilized for deverbal”noun formation as in (5). 
2.2. Navajo (an Athabaskan) 
Let us start with the following quotation from Sapir (1923）：“As is well known by students 
of Athabaskan li時uistics,the Athabaskan adjective is in form a verb，＇’（p. 136). Broadly 
surveying Athabaskan languages, S叩ir( 1923) reports that when enclitic -e is attached to a 
verbal stem, the form produced can be construed as expressing an adjectival notion, as 
exemplified in (6). Note that we cal this enclitic -e“Athabaskan relative suffix，＇’following 
Sapir (1923:136). 
(6) dles gin-e 
grease melt-REL 
‘meltable grease’ 
Sapir (1923: 137) 
Furthermore, Sapir (1923) accounts for the fact that this verbal form with the Athabaskan 
relative suffix can be employed without head nouns so that the form can refer to a referent on its 
own, as shown in (7) and (8). 
(7)a. de・1-ba ‘tobe gray’ 
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(i）‘grumbler’ Sapir (1923: 137) 
In addition, from the second meaning shown in (8b ),it is clearly the case that the verbal form 
with the Athabaskan relative suffix plays a role in producing lexicalized deverbal nouns; 
another example is given in (9) below. 
・ (9)a. -k’we 'to lie habitually’ b. -k’wc:-e ‘lier' Sapir (1923: 137) 
Concerning the formation of relative-clause counte中artsin Navajo, Young and Morgan 
(1980:55) and Willie (1989:413) suggest that Navajo has four relative enclitics, -i, -i, -igi and 
-¢(, which are al regarded as sharing the same etymology with the Athabaskan relative suffix 
above (Sapir 1923:139), and the latter two enclitics are in particular utilized for "clausal 
relativization.” Now let us consider the following three examples to learn the essential 
properties of Navajo’s relative clause counte中art:
(10) a. 'ashkii ['at'eed yizts'Qsy-¢((] yalti’ 
boy girl yi:kissed-REL 3sS:speak 
'The boy who kissed the girl is speaking.’ 







‘The one who kissed the girl is speaking.’ 
(The one such that he kisses the girl -he is speaking.) 







‘There are too many grasshoppers.’（L巾rary:ones who hop円）
(Willie 1989:413, minor modification added) 
Example (lOa) and (lOb) are considered as Athabaskan counterparts of th巴headedrelative 
clause and the headless relative clause, respectively, and exactly the same phrase of 'at'eed 
yizts ＇σisy－¢~， which is brack巴tedis employed in both of the examples; it can be employed with or 
without the antecedent noun. In addition, example ( 1 Oc)shows ambiguity of the interpretation 
of the verbal form suffixed by -igi (an Athabaskan relative suffix): one is a lexicalized sense of 
hopping, i.e.‘grasshoppers,' and the other is a reading of a headless relative clause like (1 Ob), 
i.e.‘the ones who hop.' 
The point here is that just as in examples (7) to (9), the verbal form with Athabaskan 
relative suffix, -e, can be employed for the three ways of the adjectival use with the head noun, 
of the independent referential use without the head noun, and of lexicalized use, so in (10), the 
verbal form with the Navajo variants of Athabaskan relativ巴suffixcan be utilized for th巴three
ways: the counterparts of relative clause with the head noun and of relative clause without the 
head noun, and lexicalized use. Arguing against the line of generative-grammar analyses that 
assumes PRO in the clause created by the Navajo verbal forms with the variants of Athabaskan 
relative suffi民 Willie(1989) suggests that the verbal form itself can have an independent 
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referential function, examining various types of examples including ( 1 Ob)and ( lOc ). 
In sum, Willie’s argument and our observation here may lead to the following idea on 
Athabaskan relative suffixes: they may be traditionally considered as the marker of 
relativization that creates adjectival or relative-clause counte中artsin Navajo (e.g. Sapir 
1923:f.4). However, ifwe remove the theoretical bias that Navajo must have a construction 
specialized for relativization like English, the Athabaskan relativ巴SU百ixesshould be considered 
as functioning as a nominalization marker exactly like CAY’s -lria shown in 2.1; the verbal 
forms in the two languages share the essential properties of (i) independently referring to a 
referent without th巴antecedentnoun: (3c) and (4c) for CAY and (lOb) and (lOc) for Navajo, (i) 
serving as potential sources of lexicalized nouns: (5) for CAY and (8b) and (lOc) for Navajo. 
Furthermore, giv巴nthat (i) and (i) are a valid analysis, it should be reasonable to suppose that 
Nav勾o’sexample of (10), i.e. headed relative-clause counte中art,instantiates appositive 
construction of the two nominals like CAY’s examples of (2) and (4b). 
2.3. Implications 
Now we may encounter a theoretical question of why the two languages observed above 
employ essentially the same coding strategy to express the grammatical notions出athave 
traditionally been handled under the four independent categories of adjective, headed relative 
clause, headless relative clause, and deverbal noun. For further clarification, let us briefly 
review Croft’s (1991) functional characterization of grammatical categories as shown in Table 1 
below: 
Reference Modification Predication 
0句ec飴 UNMARKED genitive，叫jecti・ predicate 
NOUNS valizations, nominals 
pp’s on nouns 
Properties dea~jectivaJ UNMARKED predicate 
nouns ADJE口 IV日 adjectives 
Actions action nominals, participles, UNMARKED 
complements, relative VERBS 
infinitives, clauses 
gerunds 
Table 1. Functional Characterization of Grammatical Categories (Croft 1991 :67) 
Croft (1991) attempts to account for grammatical categories in terms of the two parameters of 
grammatical function and ontology: the former parameter is shown horizontally with the factors 
of reference, modification and predication, and the latter is indicated vertically with the factors 
of objects, prop巴rties,and actions. Furthermor巴， thegenerally assumed grammatical categories 
are allocated between the two parameters. Following Table 1, the grammatical categories 
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concerned here are specified as follows: (i) relative clauses inherently show the grammatical 
function of modification and the ontological sta印sof action; (i) adjectivalization of 
modification and objects; and (ii) action nominals ( deverbal nouns) of reference and actions. 
While we may accept the essence of Croft’s functional characterization of grammatical 
categories, we also realize that Table 1 would not give us an answer for the issue of why the two 
grammatical functions of reference and modification are expressed in a single coding strategy in 
the Eskimo and Athabaskan languages as observed above. This lack of characterization leads 
us to ask for a higher-order category to motivate the Eskimo and Athabaskan bipartite system; 
and the higher-order category will be the theoretical construct of nominalization that was 
proposed by Shibatani (2009, 2014). 
3. Nominalization and Metonymic Coercion 
The aim of this section is to provide an answer for the issue presented in the previous 
section: what cognitive-functional principle motivates the bipartite system of reference and 
modification observed in the Eskimo and Athabaskan languages. For that pu叩ose,we first 
outline the theory of nominalization proposed by Shibatani (2009, 2014) and then, we propose 
an idea referred to here as metonymic coercion. 
3.1. Nominalization 
Examining many Asian and European languages, Shibatani argues that the "grammatical 
category that is generally called relative clause (or its equivalent) should be regarded as the 
modification function of nominalization”（Shibatani 2014:118, my translation). With example 
(11 ), let us elucidate the nucleus of Shibatani’s theory on nominalization. 
(11) Marry a man [who you love 0]. 
Shibatani (2014:3) first argues against the generative-grammar tradition that regards relative 
clauses as a type of sentence, i.e. S; some illocutionary force such as assertion or command 
conveying the speaker’S intention always accompanies sentences uttered. However, such an 
illocutionary force is never observed in, for instance, the relative clause part of [who you loνe (J] 
in (11). When we characterize the relative clause with a functional perspective, we would 
obtain the function of modification rather than that of assertion or similar. Furthermore, 
consider the example below: 
(12) Marry [who you love 0]. 
In English, the same relative clause can be employed without the antecedent noun, which 
suggests that the relative clause may on its own instantiate some referential function like 
nominals. 
What Shibatani suggests, analyzing Asian and European languages, is that linguistics fails 
to propose a proper descriptive notion for grammatical phenomena that at the level of syntax, 
one typ巴of(complex) construction can be utilized for both refer四1ceand modification just like 
46 





e g. e.庁＞ploy云ternp/oyrnen~ 
fe，庁’•player
e.g. e庁＞ploy →~ i 
[employ.ζ坦
Event: n口町、lnallzat:lons
.ーg.(that) fJohn en>p/oys阿 a’yJ
Argu打、entnoπ叶nallza目。ns
e.g. (the one) ""'10 f"' ernpto四 MaryJ
(the one）町＂！J.o£P..J['John employs点J
Table 2. Classification ofNominalization (A simplified version of Shibatani 2014：・ 48)
Table 2 indicates that the notion of nominalization is assumed as a superordinate category, and 
traditional constructions such as relative clause and complement clause are classified as its 
subcategories, i.e. as grammatical nominalization. The classification based on grammatical 
function captures the fact that as lexical nouns can be employed for both functions of 
modification and reference such as (i) cotton mill, cotton, (i）αfire fly, fire, and (ii）αbus stop, 
a bus, relative clauses and complement clauses can also be utilized for the two functions. 
Recall here that in the tradition of generative grammar, the latter two constructions are grouped 
together under the label of sentences (e.g CP, TP, or S), and the functional commonality 
between lexical nominalization and grammatical nominalization has been considered less 
serious, ortotally ignored. 
Now let us return to the Eskimo and Athabaskan languages observed above. Our issues 
proposed in the previous sections were: why the same formal strategy is employed for the four 
types of linguistic coding traditionally called “adjective，＇’“headed relative clause，”“headless 
relative clause，＇’and “deverbal noun，＇’ and why it shows the bipartite system of reference and 
modification. Shibatani’s (2014) nominalization leads us to suggest that the grammar of the 
two languages just responds to the functional parameter of nominalization; without it, the two 
languages would seem to employ one coding strategy in an inconsistent manner, letting it 
stretch over several unrelated grammatical categories. Our data and analysis of the Eskimo and 
Athabskan languages should support Shibatani’s (2009, 2014) theoretical claim that the 
grammatical category of nominalization should be pos加lated not to miss important 
cross-linguistic and typological generalizations. 
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3.2. Metonymic Coercion 
Given the analysis on nominalization, one question remains: what cognitiv巴 principle
motivates the grammatical function of nominalization? In other words, our final issue is to 
discuss why nominalized forms, whether they are lexical or grammatical, show the bipartite 
function of reference and modification. Shibatani (2014:118) suggests that nominalization is 
underlain by a cognitive process of metonymy; the nominalized form of [who you loνe .a] in 
(11) and (12), for instance, can obtain a certain referent because, in English, a strategy of 
gapping is utilized as a conventionalized means, i.e. a reference point for metonymy, to pay 
at町1tionto a missing participant in the overall event concept invoked by event nominalization. 
If the referent is further elaborated linguistically like ［αman] [who you love .a] in (11），出e
appositional nominal phrase is introduced in which the former nominal, a man, serves as出e
head nominal of the compound nominal; otherwise, as in (12), the referent is determined by 
context. 
Agreeing with the idea that nominalization is underlain by metonymy, however, we have to 
further expand on the role of metonymy in the nominal construal in order to solve the problem 
of why the bipartite system of predication and modification is observed cross-linguistically as 
part of grammar in many languages (or perhaps universally). For this pu中ose,we shall 
propose the following principle as a fundamental aspect of nominal construal, which is inspired 
by Jackendoff’s (2012) and Langacker’s (2008) ideas on cognitive construal: 
(13) Metonymic coercion is inherent in every nominal construal. 
What (13) indicates is that every nominal construal, whether it is a simple noun or a 
gra即 naticalizednominalized-form, accompanies some conceptual 叫justmentin targeting a 
referent. 
To clarify the way the concept proposed in (13) works, let us here consider Jackendoffs 
(2012) idea of enriched compositionαlity as summarized in (14) below: 
(14）『＇Themeaning of a compound expression (a phr出 e,sentence, or discourse) is a 
function of the meanings of its parts, of the grammatical rules by which they are 
combined-and of other stuff，” 
(Jackendoff2012：・61,my underline, cf. Langacker's 2000 partial compositionality) 
With the idea of emiched compositionality, Jackendoff (2012) makes a claim that while 
linguistics explicitly or implicitly follows the id巴aof Fregean compositionality：“the meaning of 
a phrase or a sentence is made up of the meaning of its words, and the grammatical structure 
tels how to paste the word meaning together" (p.62), the language in actual use hardly shows 
such an integrity, and it always goes together with “other stuff' that beyond linguistic forms. 
For instance, consider examples (15) below: 
(15) a. f.@!Q is there on the top shelf, next to Wittgenstein. [Plato= a book of Plato] 
b. Let's check out the wax museum. The have血豆旦旦並旦ondisplay. 
[the Beatles= statues of the Beatles] 
c. [One waitress says to another] The ham sandwich in the corner wants some coffee. 
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[ham sandwich=person who ordered/who’s eating a ham sandwich] 
(Jackendoff 2012:67, my underlines cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980) 
In (15) the nominals underlined are taken as those indicated in the brackets. If we accept the 
Fregean compositionality, following Jackendoff (2012), we have to assume that, for instance, in 
(15a), the noun phrase a book ザPlatois first postulated linguistically, and the head pa此ofthe 
phrase, a book of, is then deleted. The point made by Jackendoff's emiched compositionality 
is that rather than postulating such an extra formal operation for the nominal construal of (15), it 
is natural to suppose that, as “other stuff，＇’some cognitive process, reference transfer/metonymy 
in this case, always works together to make out what meaning is intended by linguistic forms 
uttered. 
Now let us go back to our issue of why the nominalized form shows the b中artitesystem of 
reference and modification. Given Jackendoffs observation above and a series of works of 
Langacker on the na印reof construal and reference point ability (e.g. Langacker 1991 :ch.3, 
2008:ch.3), every construal accompanies some cognitive adjustments. Not only does the 
construal in examples (15) accompany some meton戸nicinterpretation, but even in that of a 
simple nominal like John has_g_坐gthe target referent is accessed via a type concept of dog 
rather than accessed directly. With the broad application of the function of metonymy, we can 
say that metonymic adjustment, i.e. the metonymic coercion to create a force to choose a 
contextually proper referent among potential candidates, is immanent of nominal construal. 
Whether or not the metonymic relationship is expressed overtly or covertly depends on how 
much information the speaker and hearer share. The les information they share, the more 
linguistic forms are required to get the referent identification to go smoothly; the modification 
part of the noun phrase such as adjectives or relative clauses is considered a linguistic 
realization of conceptual lubrication for the referent identification. On the other hand, the 
more information they share, the less linguistic forms are required; pronouns as the least value 
may be employed when the referent is already identified between the speaker and hearer. This 
implies that the two notions of reference and modification have the same cognitive function of 
targeting a referent. In other words, the function of modification does not concep加ally
separate itself from the function of reference, but the former constitutes a vital part of the later, 
which underlies the reason why not a few languages can employ the same coding strategy for 
reference and modification. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this article was to advance Shibatani’s theory of nominalization with an 
exploration of the American languages of Eskimo and Athabaskan. After observing the 
essential characteristics of the Eskimo and Athabaskan counterparts of 叫jectivesand relative 
clauses, we discussed the issue of why the traditional notion of relative clause could be 
considered as insufficient to capture the relevant linguistic facts. In particular, to provide an 
answer for the issue of why the two grammatical functions of reference and modification are 
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expressed with a single coding strategy in the Eskimo and Athabaskan languages, we proposed 
the notion of rnetonyrnic coercion with the airn of refining the theoretical notion of 
norninaliza tion. 
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